ence
of our own. I have never seen a systematic and detailed exposition of
this doctrine. It appears rather in the form of hints dropped in
passing. A number of such are to be found in Taylor's "Elements of
Metaphysics."

Section 43. The "Mind-stuff" doctrine is examined at length and its
origin discussed in Chapter XXXI of the "System of Metaphysics,"
"Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus." It is well worth while for
the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay "On the Nature of
Things-in-themselves," even if he is pressed for time.

CHAPTER XI, section 44. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XV, "The
World as Mechanism."

Section 45. See Chapter XXXI, "The Place of Mind in Nature."

Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its
difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter
XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense
of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the
common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The
Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe."

Fatalism and Determinism are constantly confused, and much of the
opposition to Determinism is attributable to this confusion.

Section 47. See Chapter XXXII, "Mechanism and Teleology."

CHAPTER XII, section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in
point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of
Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is entitled "Of our
Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of
some of his sections:--

Section 1. "It is to be had only by sensation."

Section 2. "Instance whiteness of this paper."

Section 3. "This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be
called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us."

Locke's argument proceeds, as we have seen, on the assumption that we
perceive external things directly,--an assumption into which he slips
unawares,--and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly
what is external. This makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has
not absolute proof, after all. The section that closes the discussion
is entitled: "Folly to expect demonstration in everything."

Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers
would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's
"Principles of Human Knowledge" and his "Thre