d what is said in my chapter on "The
Atomic Self," above referred to. The subject should be approached with
an open mind, and one should suspend judgment until both sides have
been heard from.
Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and
that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded
their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland."
Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended
it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral
product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the
steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He
made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of
Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton Theory: its Genesis."
We owe the doctrine of parallelism, in its original form, to Spinoza.
It was elaborated by W. K. Clifford, and to him the modern interest in
the subject is largely due. The whole subject is discussed at length
in my "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XIX-XXI. The titles are: "The
Automaton Theory: Parallelism," "What is Parallelism?" and "The Man and
the Candlestick." Clifford's doctrine is presented in a new form in
Professor Strong's recent brilliant work, "Why the Mind has a Body"
N.Y., 1903.
Section 38. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXIV, "The Time and
Place of Sensations and Ideas."
CHAPTER X, sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII
and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of
Minds."
Writers seem to be divided into three camps on this question of other
minds.
(1) I have treated our knowledge of other minds as due to an inference.
This is the position usually taken.
(2) We have seen that Huxley and Clifford cast doubts upon the validity
of the inference, but, nevertheless, made it. Professor Strong, in the
work mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, maintains that it
is not an inference, and that we do not directly perceive other minds,
but that we are assured of their existence just the same. He makes our
knowledge an "intuition" in the old-fashioned sense of the word, a
something to be accepted but not to be accounted for.
(3) Writers who have been influenced more or less by the Neo-Kantian or
Neo-Hegelian doctrine are apt to speak as though we had the same direct
evidence of the existence of other minds that we have of the exist
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