f the bias I am discussing is, that books
and authors are praised or condemned indiscriminately because of their
point of view, and little discrimination is made between good books and
poor books. There is all the difference in the world between a work
which can be condemned only on the ground that it is realistic or
idealistic in its standpoint, and those feeble productions which are to
be condemned from every point of view. If we consistently carry out
the principle that we may condemn all those who are not of our party,
we must give short shrift to a majority of the great men of the past.
So I say, beware of authority in philosophy, and, above all, beware of
that most insidious form of authority, the spirit of the "school." It
cannot but narrow our sympathies and restrict our outlook.
91. REMEMBER THAT ORDINARY RULES OF EVIDENCE APPLY.--What I am going to
say in this section is closely related to what has been said just
above. To the disinterested observer it may seem rather amusing that
one should think it worth while to try to show that we have not the
right to use a special set of weights and measures when we are dealing
with things philosophical. There was a time when men held that a given
doctrine could be philosophically false, and, at the same time,
theologically true; but surely the day of such twists and turnings is
past!
I am by no means sure that it is past. With the lapse of time, old
doctrines take on new aspects, and come to be couched in a language
that suits the temper of the later age. Sometimes the doctrine is
veiled and rendered less startling, but remains essentially what it was
before, and may be criticised in much the same way.
I suppose we may say that every one who is animated by the party spirit
discussed above, and who holds to a group of philosophical tenets with
a warmth of conviction out of proportion to the authority of the actual
evidence which may be claimed for them, is tacitly assuming that the
truth or falsity of philosophical dogmas is not wholly a matter of
evidence, but that the desires of the philosopher may also be taken
into account.
This position is often taken unconsciously. Thus, when, instead of
proving to others that a given doctrine is false, we try to show them
that it is a dangerous doctrine, and leads to unpalatable consequences,
we assume that what seems distasteful cannot be true, and we count on
the fact that men incline to believe what they like
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