kably as you can discover whether there is or is not
furniture in the drawing-room,--would you go? He thought over the
matter for a while, and then answered frankly; No! I should not go; I
should stay out here and argue it out.

92. AIM AT CLEARNESS AND SIMPLICITY.--There is no department of
investigation in which it is not desirable to cultivate clearness and
simplicity in thinking, speaking, and writing. But there are certain
reasons why we should be especially on our guard in philosophy against
the danger of employing a tongue "not understanded of the people."
There are dangerous pitfalls concealed under the use of technical words
and phrases.

The value of technical expressions in the special sciences must be
conceded. They are supposed to be more exact and less ambiguous than
terms in ordinary use, and they mark an advance in our knowledge of the
subject. The distinctions which they indicate have been carefully
drawn, and appear to be of such authority that they should be generally
accepted. Sometimes, as, for example, in mathematics, a conventional
set of symbols may quite usurp the function of ordinary language, and
may enormously curtail the labor of setting forth the processes and
results of investigation.

But we must never forget that we have not in philosophy an
authoritative body of truth which we have the right to impose upon all
who enter that field. A multitude of distinctions have been made and
are made; but the representatives of different schools of thought are
not at one touching the value and significance of these distinctions.
If we coin a word or a phrase to mark such, there is some danger that
we fall into the habit of using such words or phrases, as we use the
coins in our purse, without closely examining them, and with the ready
assumption that they must pass current everywhere.

Thus, there is always a possibility that our technical expressions may
be nothing less than crystallized error. Against this we should surely
be on our guard.

Again. When we translate the language of common life into the dialect
of the learned, there is danger that we may fall into the error of
supposing that we are adding to our knowledge, even though we are doing
nothing save to exchange one set of words for another. Thus, we all
know very well that one mind can communicate with another. One does
not have to be a scholar to be aware of this. If we choose to call
this "intersubjective intercourse," w