so there probably is some error in
whatever may happen to be the form of doctrine generally received in
his own time? The evolution of humanity is not yet at an end; men
still struggle to see clearly, and fall short of the ideal; it must be
a good thing to be freed from the dogmatic assumption of finality
natural to the man of limited outlook. In studying the history of
philosophy sympathetically we are not merely calling to our aid critics
who possess the advantage of seeing things from a different point of
view, but we are reminding ourselves that we, too, are human and
fallible.

86. PHILOSOPHY AS POETRY, AND PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE.--The recognition
of the truth that the problems of reflection do not admit of easy
solution and that verification can scarcely be expected as it can in
the fields of the special sciences, need not, even when it is brought
home to us, as it is apt to be, by the study of the history of
philosophy, lead us to believe that philosophies are like the fashions,
a something gotten up to suit the taste of the day, and to be dismissed
without regret as soon as that taste changes.

Philosophy is sometimes compared with poetry. It is argued that each
age must have its own poetry, even though it be inferior to that which
it has inherited from the past. Just so, it is said, each age must
have its own philosophy, and the philosophy of an earlier age will not
satisfy its demands. The implication is that in dealing with
philosophy we are not concerned with what is true or untrue in itself
considered, but with what is satisfying to us or the reverse.

Now, it would sound absurd to say that each age must have its own
geometry or its own physics. The fact that it has long been known that
the sum of the interior angles of a plane triangle is equal to two
right angles, does not warrant me in repudiating that truth; nor am I
justified in doing so, and in believing the opposite, merely because I
find the statement uninteresting or distasteful. When we are dealing
with such matters as these, we recognize that truth is truth, and that,
if we mistake it or refuse to recognize it, so much the worse for us.

Is it otherwise in philosophy? Is it a perfectly proper thing that, in
one age, men should be idealists, and in another, materialists; in one,
theists, and in another, agnostics? Is the distinction between true
and false nothing else than the distinction between what is in harmony
with the spirit of