reflective analysis of precisely the
type employed in making the metaphysical analyses contained in the
earlier chapters of this book. We are treating our experience as it is
not treated in common thought and in science.
And it should be remarked, in the second place, that the investigation
of our knowledge inevitably runs together with an investigation into
the nature of things known, of the mind and the world. Suppose that I
give the titles of the chapters in Part III of Mr. Hobhouse's able work
on "The Theory of Knowledge." They are as follows: Validity; the
Validity of Knowledge; the Conception of External Reality; Substance;
the Conception of Self; Reality as a System; Knowledge and Reality; the
Grounds of Knowledge and Belief.
Are not these topics metaphysical? Let us ask ourselves how it would
affect our views of the validity and of the limits of our knowledge, if
we were converted to the metaphysical doctrines of John Locke, or of
Bishop Berkeley, or of David Hume, or of Thomas Reid, or of Immanuel
Kant.
We may, then, regard epistemology as a part of logic--the metaphysical
part--or as a part of metaphysics; it does not much matter which we
call it, since we mean the same thing. But its relation to metaphysics
is such that it does not seem worth while to call it a separate
discipline.
Before leaving this subject there is one more point upon which I should
touch, if only to obviate a possible misunderstanding.
We find in Professor Cornelius's clear little book, "An Introduction to
Philosophy" (Leipzig, 1903; it has unhappily not yet been translated
into English), that metaphysics is repudiated altogether, and
epistemology is set in its place. But this rejection of metaphysics
does not necessarily imply the denial of the value of such an analysis
of our experience as I have in this work called metaphysical.
Metaphysics is taken to mean, not an analysis of experience, but a
groping behind the veil of phenomena for some reality not given in
experience. In other words, what Professor Cornelius condemns is what
many of the rest of us also condemn under another name. What he calls
metaphysics, we call bad metaphysics; and what he calls epistemology,
we call metaphysics. The dispute is really a dispute touching the
proper name to apply to reflective analysis of a certain kind.
As it is the fashion in certain quarters to abuse metaphysics, I set
the reader on his guard. Some kinds of metaphysics c
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