d will pertain to His eternal
essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men
generally use them, for the intellect and will which could constitute
His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will,
and could resemble ours in nothing except in name. There could be no
further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the
Dog and the animal which barks. This I will demonstrate as follows: If
intellect pertains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect,
follow the things which are its object (as many suppose), nor can it be
simultaneous in its nature with them, since God is prior to all things
in causality; but, on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of
things is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in God's
intellect. Therefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived
to constitute His essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of
their essence and of their existence,--a truth which seems to have been
understood by those who have maintained that God's intellect, will, and
power are one and the same thing.

Since, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of
their essence and of their existence (as we have already shown), it must
necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and
existence; for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which
it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the
existence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is an
eternal truth; and therefore with regard to essence the two men may
exactly resemble one another, but with regard to existence they must
differ. Consequently if the existence of one should perish, that of the
other will not therefore perish; but if the essence of one could be
destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be likewise
destroyed. Therefore a thing which is the cause both of the essence and
of the existence of any effect must differ from that effect both with
regard to its essence and with regard to its existence. But the
intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and existence of our
intellect; therefore the intellect of God, so far as it is conceived to
constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with
regard to its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with our
intellect in anything except the name, which is what we essayed to
prove. The same demonstr