hings which can be conceived by the
infinite intellect) must follow.
This proposition must be plain to every one who considers that from the
given definition of anything a number of properties necessarily
following from it (that is to say, following from the essence of the
thing itself) are inferred by the intellect, and just in proportion as
the definition of the thing expresses a greater reality, that is to say,
just in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves a
greater reality, will more properties be inferred. But the divine nature
possesses absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6), each one of which
expresses infinite essence in its own kind (_in suo genere_), and
therefore, from the necessity of the divine nature, infinite numbers of
things in infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be
conceived by the infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Hence it
follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall
under the infinite intellect. It follows, secondly, that God is cause
through Himself, and not through that which is contingent (_per
accidens_). It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause.
II
We have just shown that from the necessity, or (which is the same thing)
from the laws only of the divine nature, infinite numbers of things
absolutely follow: and we have demonstrated that nothing can be, nor can
be conceived, without God, but that all things are in God. Therefore,
outside Himself, there can be nothing by which He may be determined or
compelled to act; and therefore He acts from the laws of His own nature
only, and is compelled by no one.
Hence it follows, firstly, that there is no cause, either external to
God or within Him, which can excite Him to act except the perfection of
His own nature. It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause;
for God alone exists from the necessity alone of His own nature and acts
from the necessity alone of His own nature. Therefore He alone is a free
cause.
There are some who think that God is a free cause because He can, as
they think, bring about that those things which we have said follow from
His nature--that is to say, those things which are in His power--should
not be, or should not be produced by Him. But this is simply saying that
God could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a
triangle that its three angles should be equal to two right angles, or
that from a given
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