thers seems so far necessarily connected with joy in their
prosperity, as that whoever rejoices in one must unavoidably
compassionate the other; there cannot be that delight or satisfaction,
which appears to be so considerable, without the inconveniences, whatever
they are, of compassion.
However, without considering this connection, there is no doubt but that
more good than evil, more delight than sorrow, arises from compassion
itself; there being so many things which balance the sorrow of it. There
is first the relief which the distressed feel from this affection in
others towards them. There is likewise the additional misery which they
would feel from the reflection that no one commiserated their case. It
is indeed true that any disposition, prevailing beyond a certain degree,
becomes somewhat wrong; and we have ways of speaking, which, though they
do not directly express that excess, yet always lead our thoughts to it,
and give us the notion of it. Thus, when mention is made of delight in
being pitied, this always conveys to our mind the notion of somewhat
which is really a weakness. The manner of speaking, I say, implies a
certain weakness and feebleness of mind, which is and ought to be
disapproved. But men of the greatest fortitude would in distress feel
uneasiness from knowing that no person in the world had any sort of
compassion or real concern for them; and in some cases, especially when
the temper is enfeebled by sickness, or any long and great distress,
doubtless, would feel a kind of relief even from the helpless goodwill
and ineffectual assistances of those about them. Over against the sorrow
of compassion is likewise to be set a peculiar calm kind of satisfaction,
which accompanies it, unless in cases where the distress of another is by
some means so brought home to ourselves as to become in a manner our own;
or when from weakness of mind the affection rises too high, which ought
to be corrected. This tranquillity, or calm satisfaction, proceeds
partly from consciousness of a right affection and temper of mind, and
partly from a sense of our own freedom from the misery we compassionate.
This last may possibly appear to some at first sight faulty; but it
really is not so. It is the same with that positive enjoyment, which
sudden ease from pain for the present affords, arising from a real sense
of misery, joined with a sense of our freedom from it; which in all cases
must afford some degree of sat
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