man
nature, as represented in the Gospels mourning, and even, in a literal
sense, weeping over the distresses of His creatures.
The observation already made, that, of the two affections mentioned in
the text, the latter exerts itself much more than the former; that, from
the original constitution of human nature, we much more generally and
sensibly compassionate the distressed than rejoice within the prosperous,
requires to be particularly considered. This observation, therefore,
with the reflections which arise out of it, and which it leads our
thoughts to, shall be the subject of another discourse.
For the conclusion of this, let me just take notice of the danger of over-
great refinements; of going beside or beyond the plain, obvious, first
appearances of things, upon the subject of morals and religion. The
least observation will show how little the generality of men are capable
of speculations. Therefore morality and religion must be somewhat plan
and easy to be understood: it must appeal to what we call plain common
sense, as distinguished from superior capacity and improvement; because
it appeals to mankind. Persons of superior capacity and improvement have
often fallen into errors which no one of mere common understanding could.
Is it possible that one of this latter character could even of himself
have thought that there was absolutely no such thing in mankind as
affection to the good of others? suppose of parents to their children; or
that what he felt upon seeing a friend in distress was only fear for
himself; or, upon supposition of the affections of kindness and
compassion, that it was the business of wisdom and virtue to set him
about extirpating them as fast as he could? And yet each of these
manifest contradictions to nature has been laid down by men of
speculation as a discovery in moral philosophy; which they, it seems,
have found out through all the specious appearances to the contrary. This
reflection may be extended further. The extravagances of enthusiasm and
superstition do not at all lie in the road of common sense; and
therefore, so far as they are _original mistakes_, must be owing to going
beside or beyond it. Now, since inquiry and examination can relate only
to things so obscure and uncertain as to stand in need of it, and to
persons who are capable of it; the proper advice to be given to plain
honest men, to secure them from the extremes both of superstition and
irreligion, is tha
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