mind, particularly the
last; "Has not each man troubles enough of his own? must he indulge an
affection which appropriates to himself those of others? which leads him
to contract the least desirable of all friendships, friendships with the
unfortunate? Must we invert the known rule of prudence, and choose to
associate ourselves with the distressed? or, allowing that we ought, so
far as it is in our power to relieve them, yet is it not better to do
this from reason and duty? Does not passion and affection of every kind
perpetually mislead us? Nay, is not passion and affection itself a
weakness, and what a perfect being must be entirely free from?" Perhaps
so, but it is mankind I am speaking of; imperfect creatures, and who
naturally and, from the condition we are placed in, necessarily depend
upon each other. With respect to such creatures, it would be found of as
bad consequence to eradicate all natural affections as to be entirely
governed by them. This would almost sink us to the condition of brutes;
and that would leave us without a sufficient principle of action. Reason
alone, whatever any one may wish, is not in reality a sufficient motive
of virtue in such a creature as man; but this reason joined with those
affections which God has impressed upon his heart, and when these are
allowed scope to exercise themselves, but under strict government and
direction of reason, then it is we act suitably to our nature, and to the
circumstances God has placed us in. Neither is affection itself at all a
weakness; nor does it argue defect, any otherwise than as our senses and
appetites do; they belong to our condition of nature, and are what we
cannot be without. God Almighty is, to be sure, unmoved by passion or
appetite, unchanged by affection; but then it is to be added that He
neither sees nor hears nor perceives things by any senses like ours; but
in a manner infinitely more perfect. Now, as it is an absurdity almost
too gross to be mentioned, for a man to endeavour to get rid of his
senses, because the Supreme Being discerns things more perfectly without
them; it is as real, though not so obvious an absurdity, to endeavour to
eradicate the passions He has given us, because He is without them. For,
since our passions are as really a part of our constitution as our
senses; since the former as really belong to our condition of nature as
the latter; to get rid of either is equally a violation of and breaking
in upon
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