hin itself, its
propensions, aversions, passions, affections as respecting such objects,
and in such degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In
this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a
third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent.
This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart,
temper, and actions, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the
word, though sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this
faculty tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and
leads them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus
a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him to
take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the natural
affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is his proper
business, what belongs to him, that it is right and commendable so to
do--this, added to the affection, becomes a much more settled principle,
and carries him on through more labour and difficulties for the sake of
his children than he would undergo from that affection alone, if he
thought it, and the cause of action it led to, either indifferent or
criminal. This indeed is impossible, to do that which is good and not to
approve of it; for which reason they are frequently not considered as
distinct, though they really are: for men often approve of the action of
others which they will not imitate, and likewise do that which they
approve not. It cannot possibly be denied that there is this principle
of reflection or conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an
innocent person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in
the fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given
no just cause of offence. To aggravate the injury, add the circumstances
of former friendship and obligation from the injured person; let the man
who is supposed to have done these two different actions coolly reflect
upon them afterwards, without regard to their consequences to himself: to
assert that any common man would be affected in the same way towards
these different actions, that he would make no distinction between them,
but approve or disapprove them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need
being confuted. There is therefore this principle of reflection or
conscience in mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to
private good with the re