most part are equally so to both
by the same actions.

SERMON II., III. UPON HUMAN NATURE.

ROMANS ii. 14.

_For when the Gentiles_, _which have not the law_, _do by nature the
things contained in the law_, _these_, _having not the law_, _are a
law unto themselves_.

As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise
moral obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real nature
of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such purposes only,
or more than to any other, this is a reason to believe the Author of that
nature intended it for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the eye
was intended for us to see with. And the more complex any constitution
is, and the greater variety of parts there are which thus tend to some
one end, the stronger is the proof that such end was designed. However,
when the inward frame of man is considered as any guide in morals, the
utmost caution must be used that none make peculiarities in their own
temper, or anything which is the effect of particular customs, though
observable in several, the standard of what is common to the species; and
above all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to
which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward movements
and affections; which principle will of course have some influence, but
which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown, ought to preside
over and govern all the rest. The difficulty of rightly observing the
two former cautions; the appearance there is of some small diversity
amongst mankind with respect to this faculty, with respect to their
natural sense of moral good and evil; and the attention necessary to
survey with any exactness what passes within, have occasioned that it is
not so much agreed what is the standard of the internal nature of man as
of his external form. Neither is this last exactly settled. Yet we
understand one another when we speak of the shape of a human body: so
likewise we do when we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far
soever the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is
therefore ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing
them what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and
would lead them to. Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the
practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are to be
considered as an appeal t