he constitution of our nature: that this faculty was
placed within to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate all under
principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and
office: thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate
and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they
cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot
otherwise gratify--this makes no alteration as to the _natural right_ and
_office_ of conscience.

Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and suppose there was no
such thing at all as this natural supremacy of conscience--that there was
no distinction to be made between one inward principle and another, but
only that of strength--and see what would be the consequence.

Consider, then, what is the latitude and compass of the actions of man
with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and the Supreme Being? What
are their bounds, besides that of our natural power? With respect to the
two first, they are plainly no other than these: no man seeks misery, as
such, for himself; and no one unprovoked does mischief to another for its
own sake. For in every degree within these bounds, mankind knowingly,
from passion or wantonness, bring ruin and misery upon themselves and
others. And impiety and profaneness--I mean what every one would call so
who believes the being of God--have absolutely no bounds at all. Men
blaspheme the Author of nature, formally and in words renounce their
allegiance to their Creator. Put an instance, then, with respect to any
one of these three. Though we should suppose profane swearing, and in
general that kind of impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it
implies wanton disregard and irreverence towards an infinite Being our
Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of man as reverence and
dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty Being? Or suppose a
man guilty of parricide, with all the circumstances of cruelty which such
an action can admit of. This action is done in consequence of its
principle being for the present strongest; and if there be no difference
between inward principles, but only that of strength, the strength being
given you have the whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates to
this matter. The action plainly corresponds to the principle, the
principle being in that degree of strength it was: it therefore
corresponds to the whole nature of