s being more familiar to us: but let
it be observed that it stands for the same thing precisely.

Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it that he
went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, considered
_merely_ as a part of his nature? No; for if he had acted the contrary
way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or part of his
nature--namely, passion or appetite. But to deny a present appetite,
from foresight that the gratification of it would end in immediate ruin
or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural action: whereas to
contradict or go against cool self-love for the sake of such
gratification is so in the instance before us. Such an action then being
unnatural, and its being so not arising from a man's going against a
principle or desire barely, nor in going against that principle or desire
which happens for the present to be strongest, it necessarily follows
that there must be some other difference or distinction to be made
between these two principles, passion and cool self-love, than what I
have yet taken notice of. And this difference, not being a difference in
strength or degree, I call a difference in _nature_ and in _kind_. And
since, in the instance still before us, if passion prevails over self-
love the consequent action is unnatural, but if self-love prevails over
passion the action is natural, it is manifest that self-love is in human
nature a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without
violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act
conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must
govern. Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, we may
have a clear conception of the _superior nature_ of one inward principle
to another, and see that there really is this natural superiority, quite
distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency.

Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting partly of
various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle of
reflection or conscience, leaving quite out all consideration of the
different degrees of strength in which either of them prevails, and it
will further appear that there is this natural superiority of one inward
principle to another, and that it is even part of the idea of reflection
or conscience.

Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards such and
such objects, without disti