ed one place, prospect, building, before another, so it does
not appear that there ever was a man who would not have approved an
action of humanity rather than of cruelty; interest and passion being
quite out of the case. But interest and passion do come in, and are
often too strong for and prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as
brutes have various instincts, by which they are carried on to the end
the Author of their nature intended them for, is not man in the same
condition--with this difference only, that to his instincts (_i.e._,
appetites and passion) is added the principle of reflection or
conscience? And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in following
that principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest
in them, does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey the
law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion or
conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? Thus
different men are by their particular nature hurried on to pursue honour
or riches or pleasure; there are also persons whose temper leads them in
an uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, doing good to their fellow-
creatures, as there are others who are given to suspend their judgment,
to weigh and consider things, and to act upon thought and reflection. Let
every one, then, quietly follow his nature, as passion, reflection,
appetite, the several parts of it, happen to be strongest; but let not
the man of virtue take upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the
dissolute, since these equally with him obey and follow their nature.
Thus, as in some cases we follow our nature in doing the works _contained
in the law_, so in other cases we follow nature in doing contrary."
Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition that men
follow their nature in the same sense, in violating the known rules of
justice and honesty for the sake of a present gratification, as they do
in following those rules when they have no temptation to the contrary.
And if this were true, that could not be so which St. Paul asserts, that
men are _by nature a law to themselves_. If by following nature were
meant only acting as we please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of
nature as any guide in morals; nay, the very mention of deviating from
nature would be absurd; and the mention of following it, when spoken by
way of distinction, would absolutely have no meaning. For di
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