ites distinct from benevolence,
whose primary use and intention is the security and good of society, and
the passions distinct from self-love, whose primary intention and design
is the security and good of the individual. {4} It is enough to the
present argument that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem
of them, love of society as distinct from affection to the good of it,
indignation against successful vice--that these are public affections or
passions, have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to
regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to our
fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be considered likewise as
private affections, as tending to private good, this does not hinder them
from being public affections too, or destroy the good influence of them
upon society, and their tendency to public good. It may be added that as
persons without any conviction from reason of the desirableness of life
would yet of course preserve it merely from the appetite of hunger, so,
by acting merely from regard (suppose) to reputation, without any
consideration of the good of others, men often contribute to public good.
In both these instances they are plainly instruments in the hands of
another, in the hands of Providence, to carry on ends--the preservation
of the individual and good of society--which they themselves have not in
their view or intention. The sum is, men have various appetites,
passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love
and from benevolence: all of these have a tendency to promote both public
and private good, and may be considered as respecting others and
ourselves equally and in common; but some of them seem most immediately
to respect others, or tend to public good; others of them most
immediately to respect self, or tend to private good: as the former are
not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love: neither sort are
instances of our love either to ourselves or others, but only instances
of our Maker's care and love both of the individual and the species, and
proofs that He intended we should be instruments of good to each other,
as well as that we should be so to ourselves.

Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they
distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We are
plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own
nature. The mind can take a view of what passes wit