for each other shame, sudden danger,
resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of
these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the
occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each
of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to have no
restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is the speculative
absurdity of considering ourselves as single and independent, as having
nothing in our nature which has respect to our fellow-creatures, reduced
to action and practice. And this is the same absurdity as to suppose a
hand, or any part, to have no natural respect to any other, or to the
whole body.
But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions and
principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well as to do
good? Whence come the many miseries else which men are the authors and
instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far as they relate to
the foregoing discourse, may be answered by asking, Has not man also
dispositions and principles within which lead him to do evil to himself,
as well as good? Whence come the many miseries else--sickness, pain, and
death--which men are instruments and authors of to themselves?
It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than the
other, but the answer to both is really the same: that mankind have
ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as well to the
injury of others as in contradiction to known private interest: but that
as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so neither is there any such
thing as ill-will in one man towards another, emulation and resentment
being away; whereas there is plainly benevolence or good-will: there is
no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude,
but only eager desires after such and such external goods; which,
according to a very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose
to obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to
their end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will
consider what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found
nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles and
passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-love and
benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with
regard to others as well as himself, and only secondarily and
accidentally t
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