d with Congress under some limitations. Three restrictions appear to
me to be essentially necessary to preserve that equality of rights to the
states, which it is the object of the state governments to secure to each
citizen. 1st. It ought not to be in the power of Congress, either by
treaty or otherwise, to alienate part of any state without the consent of
the legislature. 2d. They ought not to be able, by treaty or other law, to
give any legal preference to one part above another. 3d. They ought to be
restrained from creating any monopolies. Perhaps others may propose
different regulations and restrictions. One of these is to be found in the
old confederation, and another in the newly proposed plan. The third
scenes [sic] to be equally necessary.

After all that has been said and written on this subject, and on the
difficulty of amending our old constitution so as to render it adequate to
national purposes, it does not appear that any thing more was necessary to
be done, than framing two new articles. By one a limited revenue would be
given to Congress with a right to collect it, and by the other a limited
right to regulate our intercourse with foreign nations. By such an
addition we should have preserved to each state its power to defend the
rights of the citizens, and the whole empire would be capable of expanding
and receiving additions without altering its former constitution.
Congress, at the same time, by the extent of their jurisdiction, and the
number of their officers, would have acquired more respectability at home,
and a sufficient influence abroad. If any state was in such a case to
invade the rights of the Union, the other states would join in defence of
those rights, and it would be in the power of Congress to direct the
national force to that object. But it is certain that the powers of
Congress over the citizens should be small in proportion as the empire is
extended; that, in order to preserve the balance, each state may supply by
energy what is wanting in numbers. Congress would be able by such a system
as we have proposed to regulate trade with foreigners by such duties as
should effectually give the preference to the produce and manufactures of
our own country. We should then have a friendly intercourse established
between the states, upon the principles of mutual interest. A moderate
duty upon foreign vessels would give an advantage to our own people, while
it would avoid all the disadvantages arisi