etimes
exposed to the pressure of greater, and sometimes unprotected by the
weaker power in the sovereign.

It is now generally understood that it is for the security of the people
that the powers of the government should be lodged in different branches.
By this means publick business will go on when they all agree, and stop
when they disagree. The advantage of checks in government is thus
manifested where the concurrence of different branches is necessary to the
same act, but the advantage of a division of business is advantageous in
other respects. As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to
suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the
business. All human capacities are limited to a narrow space, and as no
individual is capable of practising a great variety of trades, no single
legislature is capable of managing all the variety of national and state
concerns. Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of the
judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence
arises the necessity of a division of the business into national and
local. Each department ought to have all the powers necessary for
executing its own business, under such limitations as tend to secure us
from any inequality in the operations of government. I know it is often
asked against whom in a government by representation is a bill of rights
to secure us? I answer, that such a government is indeed a government by
ourselves; but as a just government protects all alike, it is necessary
that the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended
from the rapacity and violence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights,
therefore, ought to set forth the purposes for which the compact is made,
and serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of
the majority. It is a just observation of his excellency, doctor Adams, in
his learned defence of the American constitutions that unbridled passions
produce the same effect, whether in a king, nobility, or a mob. The
experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to
use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual
against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy. Our
state constitution has wisely guarded this point. The present
confederation has also done it.

I confess that I have yet seen no sufficient reason for not amending the
confederation, though