I have weighed the argument with candour; I think it
would be much easier to amend it than the new constitution. But this is a
point on which men of very respectable character differ. There is another
point in which nearly all agree, and that is, that the new constitution
would be better in many respects if it had been differently framed. Here
the question is not so much what the amendments ought to be, as in what
manner they shall be made; whether they shall be made as conditions of our
accepting the constitution, or whether we shall first accept it, and then
try to amend it. I can hardly conceive that it should seriously be made a
question. If the first question, whether we will receive it as it stands,
be negatived, as it undoubtedly ought to be, while the conviction remains
that amendments are necessary; the next question will be, what amendments
shall be made? Here permit an individual, who glories in being a citizen
of Massachusetts, and who is anxious that her character may remain
undiminished, to propose such articles as appear to him necessary for
preserving the rights of the state. He means not to retract anything with
regard to the expediency of amending the old confederation, and rejecting
the new one totally; but only to make a proposition which he thinks
comprehends the general idea of all parties. If the new constitution means
no more than the friends of it acknowledge, they certainly can have no
objection to affixing a declaration in favor of the rights of states and
of citizens, especially as a majority of the states have not yet voted
upon it.
"Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United States be
received only upon the following conditions:
"1. Congress shall have no power to alter the time, place or manner of
elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such
state as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not
exceeding the expense of supporting its representatives or senators one
year.
"2. Congress shall not have the power of regulating the intercourse
between the states, nor to levy any direct tax on polls or estates, or any
excise.
"3. Congress shall not have power to try causes between a state and
citizens of another state, nor between citizens of different states; nor
to make any laws relative to the transfer of property between those
parties, nor any other matter which shall originate in the body of any
state.
"4. It sh
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