ut if so numerous a
representation were made from every part of the United States, with our
present population, the new Congress would consist of three thousand men;
with the population of Great Britain, to which we may arrive in half a
century, of ten thousand; and with the population of France, which we
shall probably equal in a century and a half, of thirty thousand.

Such a body of men might be an army to defend the country in case of
foreign invasion, but not a legislature, and the expense to support them
would equal the whole national revenue. By the proposed constitution the
new Congress will consist of nearly one hundred men; when our population
is equal to Great Britain of three hundred men, and when equal to France
of nine hundred. Plenty of Lawgivers! why any gentlemen should wish for
more is not conceivable.

Considering the immense territory of America, the objection with many will
be on the other side; that when the whole is populated it will constitute
a legislature unmanageable by its numbers. Convention foreseeing this
danger, have so worded the article, that if the people should at any
future time judge necessary, they may diminish the representation.

As the state legislatures have to regulate the internal policy of every
town and neighborhood, it is convenient enough to have one or two men,
particularly acquainted with every small district of country, its
interests, parties and passions. But the federal legislature can take
cognizance only of national questions and interests which in their very
nature are general, and for this purpose five or ten honest and wise men
chosen from each state; men who have had previous experience in state
legislation, will be more competent than an hundred. From an acquaintance
with their own state legislatures, they will always know the sense of the
people at large, and the expense of supporting such a number will be as
much as we ought to incur.

If the Hon. gentleman, in saying "there is not adequate provision for the
representation of the people," refers to the manner of choosing them, a
reply to this is naturally blended with its second objection, that "they
would have no security for the right of election." It is impossible to
conceive what greater security can be given, by any form of words, than we
here find.

The federal representatives are to be chosen by the votes of the people.
Every freeman is an elector. The same qualification which enables you to
vote