wish to evade the objections by such a charge. As a
member of the General Convention, and deputy from a great state, this
honorable person hath a right to speak and be heard. It gives pleasure to
know the extent of what may be objected or even surmised, by one whose
situation was the best to espy danger, and mark the defective parts of the
constitution if any such there be. Mr. Gerry, tho' in the character of an
objector, tells us "he was fully convinced that to preserve the union an
efficient government was indispensibly necessary, and that it would be
difficult to make proper amendments to the old articles of confederation,"
therefore by his own confession there was an indispensible necessity of a
system, in many particulars entirely new. He tells us further "that if the
people reject this altogether, anarchy may ensue," and what situation can
be pictured more awful than a total dissolution of all government? Many
defects in the constitution had better be risked than to fall back into
that state of rude violence, in which every man's hand is against his
neighbor, and there is no judge to decide between them, or power of
justice to control. But we hope to shew that there are no alarming defects
in the proposed structure of government, and that while a public force is
created, the liberties of the people have every possible guard.
Several of the honourable Gentlemen's objections are expressed in such
vague and indecisive terms, that they rather deserve the name of
insinuations, and we know not against what particular parts of the system
they are pointed. Others are explicit, and if real deserve serious
attention. His first objection is "that there is no adequate provision for
representation of the people." This must have respect either to the number
of representatives, or to the manner in which they are chosen. The proper
number to constitute a safe representation is a matter of judgment, in
which honest and wise men often disagree. Were it possible for all the
people to convene and give their personal assent, some would think this
the best mode of making laws, but in the present instance it is
impracticable. In towns and smaller districts where all the people may
meet conveniently and without expense this is doubtless preferable. The
state representation is composed of one or two from every town and
district, which composes an assembly not so large as to be unwieldy in
acting, nor so expensive as to burden the people. B
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