all the powers of
society_. Can you--can you _possibly_ grant anything new? Have you any
power which is not already granted to your General Assembly? You are
indeed called on to say whether a part of the powers now exercised by the
General Assembly, shall not, in future, be exercised by Congress. And it
is clearly much better for your interest, that Congress should experience
those powers than that they should continue in the General Assembly,
provided you can trust Congress as safely as the General Assembly.
What forms your security under the General Assembly? Nothing save that the
interest of the members is the same as yours. Will it be the same with
Congress? There are essentially only two differences between the formation
of Congress and of your General Assembly. One is,--that Congress are to
govern a much larger tract of country, and a much greater number of
people, consequently your proportion of the government will be much
smaller than at present. The other difference is--that the members of
Congress when elected, hold their places for two, four and six years, and
the members of Assembly only six and twelve months.
The first of these differences was discussed pretty fully in the first
number, (when there was no idea of proceeding thus far on the subject),
and has all the force as an objection against the powers of Congress, that
it would have if applied to a proposal to give up the sovereignty of the
several towns of the state, (if such sovereignty had existed,) and unite
in state government.
It would be only a repetition to enter into a consideration of this
difference between Congress and your Assembly.
It has been suggested that the six or eight members which we shall send to
Congress will be men of property, who can little feel any burthens they
may lay on society. How far is this idea supported by experience? As the
members are to pay their proportion, will they not be as careful of laying
too great burthens as poorer people? Are they less careful of their money
than the poor? This objection would be much stronger against trusting the
power out of your hands at all. If the several towns were now independent,
this objection would be much more forcible against uniting in state
government, and sending one or two of your most wealthy men to Hartford or
New Haven, to vote away your money. But this you have tried, and found
that assemblies of representatives are less willing to vote away money
than even the
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