ty requires. And where can this power be more safely
vested, than in the common legislature, men chosen by yourselves from
every part of the union, and who have the confidence of their several
states; men who must share in the burdens they impose on others; men who
by a seat in Congress are incapable of holding any office under the
states, which might prove a temptation to spoil the people for increasing
their own income?

We find another objection to be "that the executive is blended with and
will have an undue influence over the legislature." On examination you
will find this objection unfounded. The supreme executive is vested in a
President of the United States; every bill that hath passed the senate and
representatives, must be presented to the president, and if he approve it
becomes law. If he disapproves, but makes no return within ten days, it
still becomes law. If he returns the bill with his objections, the senate
and representatives consider it a second time, and if two-thirds of them
adhere to the first resolution it becomes law notwithstanding the
president's dissent. We allow the president hath an influence, tho'
strictly speaking he hath not a legislative voice; and think such an
influence must be salutary. In the president all the executive departments
meet, and he will be a channel of communication between those who make and
those who execute the laws. Many things look fair in theory which in
practice are impossible. If lawmakers, in every instance, before their
final decree, had the opinion of those who are to execute them, it would
prevent a thousand absurd ordinances, which are solemnly made, only to be
repealed, and lessen the dignity of legislation in the eyes of mankind.

The vice-president is not an executive officer while the president is in
discharge of his duty, and when he is called to preside his legislative
voice ceases. In no other instance is there even the shadow of blending or
influence between the two departments.

We are further told "that the judicial departments, or those courts of
law, to be instituted by Congress, will be oppressive." We allow it to be
possible, but from whence arises the probability of this event? State
judges may be corrupt, and juries may be prejudiced and ignorant, but
these instances are not common; and why shall we suppose they will be more
frequent under a national appointment and influence, when the eyes of a
whole empire are watching for their detection?