y it is subversive of the
principles of a free government, which requires every part to contribute
an equal proportion. For all these reasons this system ought to be
rejected, even if no better plan was proposed in the room of it. In case
of a rejection we must remain as we are, with trade extending, resources
opening, settlements enlarging, manufactures increasing, and publick debts
diminishing by fair payment. These are mighty blessings, and not to be
lost by the hasty adoption of a new system. But great as these benefits
are, which we derive from our present system, it has been shewn, that they
may be increased by giving Congress a limited power to regulate trade, and
assigning to them those branches of the impost on our foreign trade only,
which shall be equal to our proportion of their present annual demands.
While the interest is thus provided for, the sale of our lands in a very
few years will pay the principal, and the other resources of the state
will pay our own debt. The present mode of assessing the continental tax
is regulated by the extent of landed property in each state. By this rule
the Massachusetts [sic] has to pay one eighth. If we adopt the new system,
we shall surrender the whole of our impost and excise, which probably
amount to a third of those duties of the whole continent, and must come in
for about a sixth part of the remaining debt. By this means we shall be
deprived of the benefit arising from the largeness of our loans to the
continent, shall lose our ability to satisfy the just demands on the
state. Under the limitations of revenue and commercial regulation
contained in these papers, the balance will be largely in our favour; the
importance of the great states will be preserved, and the publick
creditors both of the continent and state will be satisfied without
burdening the people. For a more concise view of my proposal, I have
thrown it into the form of a resolve, supposed to be passed by the
convention which is shortly to set in this town.
"Commonwealth of Massachusetts. _Resolved_, That the form of government
lately proposed by a federal convention, held in the city of Philadelphia,
is so far injurious to the interests of this commonwealth, that we are
constrained by fidelity to our constituents to reject it; and we do hereby
reject the said proposed form and every part thereof. But in order that
the union of these states may, as far as possible, be promoted, and the
federal business a
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