ar, we were formally given to understand that
Germany, in any war with France, might annex French colonies[11]; and it
is easy to see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policies
of the German military and naval experts.
Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has consistently refused
to believe that Germany would be mad enough or dishonest enough to enter
on a war of aggression for the dismemberment of colonial empires. German
diplomacy in the past few weeks has rudely shattered this conviction.
But up to the year 1914 the worst which was generally anticipated was
that she would pursue in the future on a great scale the policy, which
she has hitherto pursued on a small scale, of claiming so-called
'compensations' when other Powers succeeded in developing their colonial
spheres, and of invoking imaginary 'interests' as a reason why the
efforts of explorers and diplomatists should not be allowed to yield to
France their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not our
business to impugn or to defend the partition of Africa, or the methods
by which it has been brought about. But it is vital to our subject that
we should describe the methods by which Germany has endeavoured to
intimidate France at various stages of the African question. The trouble
arose out of a Moroccan Agreement between England and France, which was
the first definite proof that these two Powers were drifting into
relations closer than that of ordinary friendship.
In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel about Egypt. France
recognized the English occupation of Egypt; England, on her side,
promised not to impede the extension of French influence in Morocco. It
was agreed that neither in Egypt nor in Morocco should there be a
political revolution; and that in both countries the customs tariff
should make no distinction between one nation and another. This compact
was accompanied by a settlement of the old disputes about French fishing
rights in Newfoundland, and of more recent difficulties concerning the
frontiers between French and English possessions in West Africa.[12] The
whole group formed a step in a general policy, on both sides, of healing
local controversies which had little meaning except as instruments of
diplomatic warfare. The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco is
distinguished from that concerning West Africa and Newfoundland in so
far as it recognizes the possibility of objections on the part of
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