rs to
prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to
restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to
join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the
horrors of war from Europe.

VI

_Italy's comments on the situation_.

We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple
Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat
divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two
years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical
situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to
Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is
supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple
Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to
Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in
endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to
induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend
all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an
opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war
broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her
allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said,
is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of
Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official
documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a
conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy
was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the
idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again
approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in
London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly
to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia
to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and
went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought
most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful
whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military
operations, but made a further suggestion that

'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice
of the four Powers invited to the con