d, over a policy which England has long since
renounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great
wrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark
knows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired
with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England.
Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no
assistance in 1864. That mistake--for it was a mistake of weakness, not
deliberate treachery--has brought its own nemesis. We are still paying
for that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson.
The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as
Denmark may react on such a state as England.
England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become less
prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm of
naval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help she
can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she could
not tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires to
found. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the political
system for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. That
system England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it is
adopted.
English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with English
interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended struggling
nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece and
Italy for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill of
England to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, is
largely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature.
They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity.
They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization which
links together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and
more durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. In
this fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on
England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we have
forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunate
position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in the
same direction.
APPENDIX I
GERMANY'S REASONS
FOR
WAR WITH RUSSIA
How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby made
the European
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