1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically
amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be
called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could
not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to
co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your
idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives
of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest
means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that
such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that
news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an
intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count
Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a
satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything
else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and
Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as
yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised
against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he
meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only
mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in
north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of
mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to
locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful
not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had
caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

No. 56.

_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_

(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with
Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told
him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well
acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of
Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out
with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not
prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and
especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped th