tory of the world.' There is here
no room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_;
for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the
exclusive state--_der geschlossene Staat_--and in another sense than
that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all
foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign
articles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economy
such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this
exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentially
power: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as 'the public might for
defence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual is
self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and
self-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highest
moral duty of the state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of
feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against
the Holy Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might,
and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we
should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not
conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is
precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the
armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the
_colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that
Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he
failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that
is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is
naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture.

Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive.
The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final
character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the
glory of war.

_Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international 'law' so called
must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its
absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_
obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a
state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso
_rebus sic stantibus_. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future over
against other states.' International treaties are no abs