have been openly discussed in the Reichstag;
and the debates have usually run on the same lines, because the
Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent policy, framed for some years
ahead and embodied in an Army Act. The underlying principle of these
Army Acts (1893, 1899, 1905, 1911) was to maintain a fairly constant
ratio between the peace strength and the population. But the war
strength was disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of
1893, which reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to
two. The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increase
its war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the long-sufferance
of those who served and those who paid the bill. It was taken as
axiomatic that an increasing population ought to be protected by an
increasing army. National defence was of course alleged as the prime
consideration; and if these preparations were really required by growing
danger on the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could do
otherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power could feel itself
legitimately aggrieved.

Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent years that
national independence means the power of taking the aggressive in any
case where national interests or _amour-propre_ may prompt it. The
increase of the German army, either in numbers or in technical
efficiency, seems to be regularly followed by masterful strokes of
diplomacy in which the 'mailed fist' is plainly shown to other
continental Powers. Thus in 1909, at the close of a quinquennium of
military re-equipment, which had raised her annual army budget from
L27,000,000 to L41,000,000, Germany countenanced the Austrian annexation
of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and plainly told the authorities at St.
Petersburg that any military action against Austria would bring Russia
into a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step; _radix
malorum_ we may call it, so far as the later development of the
continental situation is concerned. Russia withdrew from the impending
conflict in 1909, but it is improbable that she has ever forgiven the
matter or the manner of the German ultimatum.

In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an attempt to
'force a quarrel on France.' But in 1911 Germany realized that her
military calculations had been insufficient, if she wished to continue
these unamiable diplomatic manners. It was not a question of
self-preserv