ation; it was a question, as the German Chancellor told the
Reichstag, of showing the world that 'Germany was firmly resolved not to
be pushed aside.' Hence the sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated,
as the Government told the Reichstag, by the events of 1911. The Russian
peril could hardly be described as imminent. The Prussian Minister of
War said publicly in 1911 that 'there was no Government which either
desired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany.' Russia had
recently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs of
weakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for general
peace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals, had retired
from office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied the Czar to the
Potsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes of Germany and Russia
over their Persian interests had been settled by agreement in 1911.

But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia's intervention
in the Balkans to secure for Servia at least commercial access to the
Adriatic. This compromise, ostensibly promoted and belauded by German
statesmanship, only increased the determination of the German Government
to 'hold the ring' in the Balkans, to claim for Austria the right of
settling her own differences with Servia as she would, and to deny
Russia any interest in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort of
the German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the peace strength by
instalments until it reached 870,000, and for the eventual provision of
a war strength of 5,400,000 men. This enormous increase was recommended
'by the unanimous judgement of the military authorities' as being
'necessary to secure the future of Germany.' The Chancellor warned the
Reichstag that, although relations were friendly with Russia, they had
to face the possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while in
Russia itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic development
and an unprecedented reorganization of the army. There was also a
reference to the new law for a return to three years' service which
France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace
establishment. But it was obvious that Russia was the main
preoccupation. Germany had forced the pace both in the aggrandizement of
her military strength and in the methods of her diplomatic intercourse.
Suddenly she found herself on the brink of an abyss. She had gone too
far; she had provok