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m to his original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand'.[139] And on the same day he declined to discuss with Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria and Servia'.[140] No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was diplomatically correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire for peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the 'equivocal and double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M. Sazonof remarked that 'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of international relations.'[141] V _Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_. There is however another question which involves the whole foreign policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France, if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from several quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.[142]' The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that 'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].' On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his conviction that 'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude[144].' Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign Af
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