ia'.[59]

After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued
to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to
reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in taking military action
in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in
Russia'.[60]

At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very
frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria
in the Servian business:--

'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up
Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian concessions were all a
sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient
to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact
that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and
retirement of Government from Belgrade.'[61]

M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this
policy of Germany pretty soon:--

'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that
Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude
adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the
whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no
influence upon their ally.... There is no doubt that the key of the
situation is to be found at Berlin.'[62]

When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is
interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed
officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion
thus:--

'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and
she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the
support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been
an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether
the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian
ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian
Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its
influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her
representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a
violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported
to his Government that Russia would never go to war.'[63]

And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with his
Russian colleague that