gland's share in the Anglo-French Agreement
had been perfectly correct, and that Germany bore England no ill-will
for effecting a _rapprochement_ with France. Still there remained a
strong impression, not only in England and France, that there had been
on Germany's part a deliberate intention to test the strength of the
Anglo-French understanding and, if possible, to show France that England
was a broken reed.

It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has taken,
since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any embarrassments in
which she had previously been involved with other Powers. In 1905 she
had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising her influence to moderate
the terms of the settlement with Japan. This was a wise step, consonant
alike with English treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests of
European civilization. It led naturally to an amicable agreement with
Russia (1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three
countries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire. It
cannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a local
character, exactly as was that with France; that our friendly
understandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate; and
that neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in Europe;
unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the precaution,
which was from time to time adopted, of permitting consultations between
the French and English military experts. It was understood that these
consultations committed neither country to a policy of common
action.[14] England was drifting from her old attitude of 'splendid
isolation'; but she had as yet no desire to involve herself, even for
defensive purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as that
which had been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy.

But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911. Again the question of
Morocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our friendship with
France. The German occupation of Agadir had, and could have, only one
meaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was
the subject of a special agreement between France and us'.[15] The
attack failed in its object. War was averted by the prompt action of the
British Government. Mr. Asquith[16] announced that Great Britain, in
discussing the Moroccan question, would have regard to British
interests, which might be more directly involved t