han had hitherto been
the case, and also to our treaty obligations with France. Somewhat later
Mr. Asquith announced that if the negotiations between France and
Germany did not reach a satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would
become an active party to the discussion.[17] The nature of British
interests were appropriately defined by Mr. Lloyd George in a Guildhall
speech as consisting in the peace of the world, the maintenance of
national honour, and the security of international trade.[18] The last
phrase was a significant reference to the fact that Agadir, though
valueless for commercial purposes, might be invaluable to any Power
which desired to molest the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubted
then, or doubts to-day, that England stood in 1911 on the brink of a war
which she had done nothing to provoke.

The situation was saved in 1911 by the solidarity of England and France.
Two Powers, which in the past had been separated by a multitude of
prejudices and conflicting ambitions, felt at last that both were
exposed to a common danger of the most serious character. Hence a new
phase in the Anglo-French _entente_, which was cemented, not by a
treaty, but by the interchange of letters between the English Secretary
for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the French Ambassador in
London (M. Paul Cambon). On November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey[19]
reminded M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 'that if
either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a
third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that
event depend on the armed assistance of the other.' Sir Edward Grey
continued:--'I agree that if either Government had grave reason to
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that
threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the
other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared
to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the
General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the
Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.'

M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was authorized to accept
the arrangement which Sir E. Grey had offered.[20]

The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic nature. Neither party
was bound to co-operate, even diplomatically, with the other