interest,--not interfering with their freedom
of action,--preserving their reputation,--estimating their character and
motives,--judging of their opinions,--consulting their feelings,--and
preserving or improving their moral condition. As a guide for his
conduct in particular instances, a man has usually a distinct impression
of what he thinks due by other men towards himself; justice requires
that he rigidly extend to others the same feelings and conduct which, in
similar circumstances, he expects from them.
(1.) Justice is due to the persons, property, and interest of others.
This constitutes Integrity or Honesty. It, of course, implies abstaining
from every kind of injury, and preserving a conscientious regard to
their rights. In this last respect, it allows us to exercise a prudent
attention to our own interest, provided the means be fair and
honourable, and that we carefully abstain from injuring others by the
measures we employ for this purpose. The great rule for our guidance, in
all such cases, is found in the immutable principles of moral rectitude;
the test of our conduct in regard to individual instances is, that it be
such as, were our own interest concerned, we should think fair and
honourable in other men.
(2.) Justice requires us not to interfere with the freedom of action of
others. This constitutes personal liberty;--but in all civil communities
the right is liable to certain restrictions;--as when a man uses his
freedom of action to the danger or injury of other men. The principles
of justice may also recognise a man's surrendering, to a certain extent,
his personal liberty, by mutual and voluntary compact, as in the case of
servants, apprentices, soldiers, &c.; but they are opposed to slavery,
in which the individual concerned is not a party to the arrangement.
(3.) Justice enjoins a regard to the reputation of others. This consists
in avoiding every thing that could be injurious to their good name,
either by direct evil speaking, or such insinuations as might give rise
to suspicion or prejudice against them. It must extend also to the
counteracting of such insinuations, when we hear them made by others,
especially in circumstances in which the individual injured has no
opportunity of defending himself. It includes, farther, that we do not
deny to others, even to rivals, any praise or credit which is justly due
to them. There is, however, one modification, equally consistent with
justice, t
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