influenced,
also, probably, in some measure, by a regard to character, or the love
of approbation. In such a man, it becomes, in individual instances, a
matter of calculation, what degree of the sacrifice of personal ease,
interest, of feeling, is to be made to this principle of action. A third
contemplates the case purely as one of duty of moral responsibility, and
acts upon this principle, though it may involve a degree of personal
exertion, or a sacrifice of personal feeling, in itself disagreeable or
even injurious to him; that is, though the strongest personal motives
would lead to a different conduct. Let the case, again, refer to one of
the desires, bearing no immediate relation to the interests of other
men. One man goes directly into the gratification of it, without any
consideration. Another, who feels the same desire, considers the
influence which the indulgence would be likely to have on his health,
interest, or reputation.--This may be considered as simply an exercise
of judgment, combined with a certain operation of self-love. A third
views the aspect of the deed purely as a question of moral
responsibility,--and, if he sees cause, decides against it on this
ground alone;--though he should perceive that it might be gratified
without any danger to his health, interest, or reputation, or even that
it might contribute to his advantage.

We have thus presented to us three characters;--one who acts upon the
high and pure ground of moral principle;--one who acts from motives of a
more contracted and personal nature, though, in certain instances, his
conduct may be the same;--and one who goes straight forward to the
gratification of a ruling desire or governing propensity, without
attending to motives of either class. The first is a uniform character,
on whose conduct we depend in any given circumstances, with a confidence
similar to that with which we rely on the operation of physical agents.
For we know the uniform tendencies of the motives or moral causes by
which he is habitually influenced, and we know his moral temperament. We
have nearly the same kind of knowledge respecting him, which we have of
the tendencies of chemical agents towards each other, and which enables
us with perfect confidence to foretel their actions. The third has also
a uniformity of conduct, though of a very different kind. We know,
likewise, his moral condition, and, to predict his conduct, we require
only to learn the particular indu