of its own speculations; and these, by a mind so prepared, are received
as truth. The inventions of the mind itself thus become the regulating
principles of its emotions, and this mental process, advancing from step
to step, terminates in moral degradation and anarchy.

Nothing can be more striking than the manner in which these great
principles of ethical science are laid down in the sacred
writings;--"the invisible things of him from the creation of the world
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his
eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse: Because
that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were
thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart
was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools; and
changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to
corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping
things."--"And even as they did not like to retain God in their
knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things
which are not convenient." The various steps, in this course of moral
degradation, are here represented as a judicial infliction by the Deity.
But this solemn view of the subject is in no degree inconsistent with
the principle, that it takes place according to a chain of sequences
existing in the mind itself. For the Almighty One, who is said to
inflict as a judgment this state of moral ruin, is the same who
established it as the uniform result of a process in the mental economy,
to be traced in the history of every man who has followed the downward
course which led him astray from virtue.

To the principles which have now been stated, we are also to refer a
point in the philosophy of human nature which presents a subject of most
interesting reflection. I allude to the fact, that the great truths of
religious belief are so often rejected, by men who have acquired a
reputation for exalted powers of understanding in other departments of
intellectual inquiry. The fact is one of intense interest; and we can
scarcely wonder that superficial observers should have deduced from it
an impression, that it implies something defective in the evidence by
which these truths are proposed to our reception. But the conclusion is
entirely unwarranted, and the important principle cannot be too often
repeated, that the attainment of truth in moral inquiries is essent