is way to a sound conclusion respecting the consequences of the action
"upon the whole, at the long run, in all its consequences, remote and
collateral."--It may certainly be doubted whether, in any case, there
is not great danger of differences of opinion arising, respecting this
extended and ultimate expediency:--and it must be admitted that, in the
man now referred to, the very circumstances of his perception of great
and immediate utility, and the state of desire connected with it, would
constitute a moral condition which might interfere, in a very material
degree, with his calculation as to its ultimate expediency. Upon
whatever system we proceed, I fear it must be conceded as a fact, that
there is a singular propensity in the mass of mankind to consider their
own pains and pleasures before those of other men; and that this
propensity must interfere with the cool course of moral calculation
which the system of utility must consider as indispensable. (2.)
Independently of this consideration, we may be allowed to doubt, whether
any human being can arrive at such an extensive knowledge, as this
theory seems to render necessary, of all the consequences of an action,
remote and collateral. This would appear to constitute a kind and degree
of knowledge to be found only in the Omniscience of the Deity. It is, in
fact, by giving its full weight to this difficulty, that the doctrine
of utility has been employed by some foreign writers, in their attempts
to undermine the whole foundation of morals. "The goodness of actions,"
says Beausobre, in his Pyrrhonisme Raisonable, "depends upon their
consequences, which man cannot foresee, nor accurately ascertain." What
harmony, indeed, or what consistency of moral sentiment can we expect
from a system, by which man himself is made the judge of the code of
morals to which he is to be subject, and by which his decisions, on a
question so momentous, are made to lest on those remote consequences of
actions which he must feel to be beyond the reach of his limited
faculties.

If these observations be well-founded, I think we cannot hesitate to
maintain, that, on such a nice calculation of consequences, it is
impossible to found a rule of morals in any degree adapted to the
necessities of man. The same objection applies to every doctrine, which
does not recognise the supreme authority of conscience as an original
part of our moral constitution, warning us of certain conduct as
immutably ri