ndue
influence.

* * * * *

The important distinction, therefore, which these observations have been
intended to illustrate, may be briefly recapitulated in the following
manner. Our impression of the aspect of actions, as right or wrong, is
conveyed by a principle in the human mind entirely distinct from a
simple exercise of reason,--and the standard of moral rectitude derived
from this source is, in its own nature, fixed and immutable. But there
are many cases in which an exercise of reason may be employed, in
referring particular actions to this standard, or trying them, as it
were, by means of it. Any such mental process, however, is only to be
considered as a kind of test applied to individual instances, and must
not be confounded with the standard to which it is the office of this
test to refer them. Right or virtuous conduct does, in point of fact,
contribute to general utility, as well as to the advantage of the
individual, in the true and extended sense of that term, and these
tendencies are perceived by Reason. But it is neither of these that
constitutes it right. This is founded entirely on a different
principle,--the immutable rule of moral rectitude; it is perceived by a
different part of our constitution,--the moral principle, or conscience;
and, by the operation of this principle, we pronounce it right, without
any reference to its consequences either to ourselves or others.

* * * * *

The preceding observations, on Conscience, I leave nearly as they stood
in the second edition of this volume. Since the publication of that
edition, I have seen various discussions of this important question, but
have found nothing to alter the opinion I have expressed, respecting the
nature and the authority of conscience as an original principle in our
moral constitution; and I see no system by which we can escape from the
numerous difficulties surrounding every other view of the subject. In
particular, I cannot perceive what is gained by those who refer our
moral decisions to a process of reason or judgment alone. For by
judgment, in the ordinary and recognised acceptation of the term, I can
understand nothing more than a power of comparing two or more facts or
impressions together, and tracing their relations. When we apply such a
mental process to a question of morals, it can amount to nothing more
than a comparison of our conduct with some standard. If