hysical
and intellectual beings, we have certain relations to the objects by
which we are surrounded, and with these we communicate by means of our
bodily senses. But, as moral beings, our relations are entirely of a
different nature; and the facts and motives, which are calculated to act
upon us in these relations, are chiefly the objects of faith: that is,
they are not cognizable by any of our senses, but are to be received by
a different part of our constitution, and upon a separate kind of
evidence. This, accordingly, is the simple but important distinction,
referred to by the sacred writer, when, in allusion to our condition as
moral beings, he says,--"we walk by faith, not by sight." The objects of
sight, here intended to express all the objects of sense, exercise over
us a habitual and powerful influence. They constantly obtrude themselves
upon our notice without any exertion of our own; and it requires a
peculiar exercise of mind to withdraw our attention from them, and to
feel the power of events which are future, and of things which are not
seen. This mental exercise is Faith. Its special province, as we have
seen, is to receive truths which are presented directly to the mind,--to
place them before us with all the vividness of actual and present
existence,--and to make them exert upon us an agency analogous to that
which is produced by objects of sight. The next great point in our
inquiry, therefore, is, what are the truths which are calculated thus to
operate upon us as moral beings, and which it is the object of faith to
bring habitually before us.

* * * * *

When we withdraw our minds from the influence of sensible things, and
send forth our attention to those truths which are the province of
faith, the first great object which meets our view is the eternal
incomprehensible One, the moral governor of the universe,--a being of
infinite perfections and infinite purity. From the stupendous works of
nature, we trace his operation as the great First Cause,--and infer,
with absolute certainty, his boundless power and wisdom, and his
independent existence. The impress of his moral attributes he has fixed
with indelible certainty, upon our moral perceptions,--where, in the
light of conscience, co-operating with a simple process of reason, we
perceive him to be a being of infinite holiness, and of unerring truth
and justice. Our knowledge of these attributes is not the result of any