oducing injurious conduct, while the feeling still rankles in the
heart, in the form of envy or hatred. These mental conditions, while
they are widely at variance with the healthy state of a rational and
responsible being, must be regarded by the Deity as constituting moral
guilt and moral degradation. Nor is it only on the mind, which
cherishes malevolent passions and impure desires and imaginations, that
the Holy One must look with a feeling of condemnation. There may be
another mental condition, in which the thoughts and desires are directed
to transient and frivolous objects, and thus run to waste amid the
trifles of the passing hour, without any feeling of the truths and
motives which demand the attention of moral beings. The pursuits of such
a man may have nothing in them that is referable either to impure desire
or malevolent affection. They may be the acquisition of wealth,--the
grasp after power,--the love of distinction,--or a devotedness to merely
trivial occupations;--while there is a total neglect of those great
concerns which really demand our chief and highest regard. Amid the
legitimate and even the laudable pursuits of ordinary life, we are too
apt to lose sight of those duties and responsibilities which attend a
state of moral discipline,--and that culture of the soul required as a
preparation for the future state of existence to which we are hastening.
But we cannot doubt that these considerations bear an important aspect
in the eye of the Deity; and that the mind in which they hold not a
habitual influence is contemplated by him as in a state of moral
destitution.
There are, accordingly, two classes of characters clearly pointed out in
the sacred writings,--namely, one in whom the conduct indicates the
depravity within,--and another, in whom the external character preserves
a respectable aspect in the estimation of men, while the moral feelings
are in a corrupted condition in the sight of God. We have formerly
endeavoured to trace the laws to which this fact is to be referred, on
the principles of the philosophy of the human mind:--they are chiefly
two: (1.) We have seen that there are original principles in our nature
which lead to a certain exercise of justice, veracity, and benevolence,
independently of any recognition of divine authority. They are a part of
our moral constitution, and calculated to promote important purposes in
the harmony of human society; and they carry along with them a certai
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