make shipwreck of a faith
which has not been founded in knowledge.

* * * * *

Before leaving the subject of the Moral Principle, there are two points
closely connected with it which remain to be noticed. The one relates
to the origin and immutability of moral distinctions, and, in connexion
with this, a class of speculations which hold a conspicuous place in the
history of Ethical science, under the name of Theories of Morals. The
other refers to a certain harmony or principle of arrangement, which the
different moral feelings ought to preserve towards each other in a
well-regulated mind.

Sec. I.--OF THE ORIGIN AND IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS AND THEORIES
OF MORALS.

In treating of the moral powers, I have considered various feelings as
distinct parts of our constitution, each intended to answer a specific
purpose in the present scene of moral discipline. I am aware of an
objection that may be urged against this mode of viewing the
subject,--namely, that it is an unnecessary multiplication of original
principles. I am not inclined to dispute respecting the term, _original
principles_. I only contend for the fact, that there are certain
feelings or propensities which are found to operate in the whole of
mankind; and, with regard to these, I consider our object to be, simply
to view man as he is. In his physical relations, we find him endowed
with a variety of senses, and a great variety of bodily functions,--each
adapted to its proper purpose, and all distinct from each other; and the
physiologist is content to view them simply as they are. Were he to
exercise his ingenuity upon them, he might contend with much
plausibility, that it is highly incorrect to speak of five distinct and
separate senses;--for that they are all merely modifications of
sensation, differing only in the various kinds of the external
impression. Thus, what is vulgarly called sight is the simple sensation
of light,--and hearing is merely the sensation of sound. This would be
all very true,--but it does not appear to elucidate the subject; nor, by
any ingenuity of such speculation, could we be enabled to know more
concerning these senses than when we called them sight and hearing. In
the same manner it would appear, that the course of inquiry, respecting
our moral feelings, is simply to observe what these feelings really are,
and what are their obvious tendencies. When we have done so on adequate