foundation, I conceive we have every reason for considering them as
principles implanted in us by the Creator, for guidance in our present
relations; and, like the functions of our bodies, so the powers and
feelings of our minds shew a wonderful adaptation and design, worthy of
their Omnipotent Cause. But we can know nothing of them beyond the
facts,--and nothing is to be gained by any attempt, however ingenious,
to simplify or explain them. We have formerly had occasion to allude to
various speculations of a similar character, respecting the powers of
perception and simple intellect,--all of which have now given way before
the general admission of the truth, that, on the questions to which they
refer, no human sagacity can carry us one step beyond the simple
knowledge of the facts.

It will probably be admitted, that there have been many similar
unprofitable speculations in the philosophy of the moral feelings; and
that these speculations, instead of throwing any light upon the subject,
have tended rather to withdraw the attention of inquirers from the
questions of deep and serious importance connected with the
investigation. Among these, perhaps, we may reckon some of the doctrines
which hold a prominent place in the history of this branch of
science,--under the name of _Theories of Morals_. These doctrines agree
in admitting the fact, that there are among mankind certain notions
respecting right and wrong,--moral and immoral actions; and they then
profess to account for these impressions,--or to explain how men come to
think one action right and another wrong. A brief view of these theories
may properly belong to an outline of this department of science.

* * * * *

In contemplating the conduct of men as placed in certain relations
towards each other, we perceive some actions which we pronounce to be
right, and others which we pronounce to be wrong. In forming our opinion
of them in this manner, we refer to the intentions of the actor, and, if
we are satisfied that he really intended what we see to be the effect or
the tendency of his conduct, or even that he purposed something which he
was prevented from accomplishing, we view him with feelings of moral
approbation or disapprobation,--or, in other words, apply to him the
award of praise or blame. Such is our simple idea of virtue or vice, as
applied either to the act or the agent. We have a conviction that there
is a line of conduct