ral
feelings. Self-love degenerates into low selfish gratification: the
desires are indulged without any other restraint than that which arises
from a mere selfish principle,--as a regard to health, perhaps in some
degree to reputation; the affections are exercised only in so far as
similar principles impose a certain degree of attention to them: present
and momentary impulses are acted upon, without any regard to future
results: conduct is adapted to present gratification, without the
perception either of its moral aspect, or its consequences to the man
himself as a responsible being; and without regard to the means by which
these feelings are gratified. In all this violation of moral harmony,
there is no derangement of the ordinary exercise of judgment. In the
most remarkable example that can be furnished by the history of human
depravity, the man may be as acute as ever in the details of business or
the pursuits of science. There is no diminution of his sound estimate
of physical relations,--for this is the province of reason. But there is
a total derangement of his sense and approbation of moral
relations,--for this is conscience. Such a condition of mind, then,
appears to be, in reference to the moral feelings, what insanity is in
regard to the intellectual. The intellectual maniac fancies himself a
king, surrounded by every form of earthly splendour,--and this
hallucination is not corrected even by the sight of his bed of straw and
all the horrors of his cell. The moral maniac pursues his way, and
thinks himself a wise and a happy man:--- but feels not that he is
treading a downward course, and is lost as a moral being.

* * * * *

In the preceding observations respecting the moral principle or
conscience, I have alluded chiefly to its influence in preserving a
certain harmony among the other feelings,--in regulating the desires by
the indications of moral purity,--and presenting self-love from
interfering with the duties and affections which we owe to other men.
But there is another and a most important purpose which is answered by
this faculty, and that is to make us acquainted with the moral
attributes of the Deity. In strict philosophical language we ought
perhaps to say, that this high purpose is accomplished by a combined
operation of conscience and reason; but, however this may be, the
process appeals clear and intelligible in its nature, and fully adapted
to the end now ass