ly apart from their true relations;--conduct is widely at
variance with what circumstances require;--ends are attempted by means
which have no relation to them;--and the ends themselves are equally at
variance with those which are suitable to the circumstances of the
individual. Such is the maniac, whom accordingly we shut up, to prevent
him from being dangerous to the public;--for he has been known to
mistake so remarkably the relation of things, and the conduct adapted to
his circumstances, as to murder his most valuable friend, or his own
helpless infant.

In all this process there is a striking analogy to certain conditions of
the moral feelings, and to the control which is exercised over them by
the principle of Conscience. By self-love, a man is led to seek his own
gratification or advantage;--and the desires direct him to certain
objects by which these propensities may be gratified. But the affections
carry forth his views to other men with whom he is connected by various
relations, and to the offices of justice, veracity, and benevolence,
which arise out of them. Conscience is the regulating power, which,
acting upon the desires and affections, as reason does upon a series of
facts, preserves among them harmony and order. It does so by repressing
the propensity of selfishness, and reminding the man of the true
relation between regard to his own interest and the duties he owes to
other men. It regulates his senses and pursuits, by carrying his views
beyond present feelings and present gratifications, to future times and
future consequences,--and by raising his attention to his relation to
the great moral Governor of the universe. He thus learns to adapt his
conduct and pursuits, not to present and transient feelings, but to an
extended view of his great and true interests as a moral being. Such is
conscience,--still, like reason, pointing out the moral ends a man ought
to pursue, and guiding him in the means by which he ought to pursue
them;--and the man does not act in conformity with the constitution of
his nature, who does not yield to conscience the supremacy and direction
over all his other feelings and principles of action. But the analogy
does not stop here;--for we can also trace a condition in which this
controlling influence of conscience is suspended or lost. I formerly
endeavoured to trace the manner in which this derangement arises, and
have now only to allude to its influence on the harmony of the mo