rtant truth, therefore, is deserving of the deepest and most
habitual attention, that character consists in a great measure in
habits, and that habits arise out of individual actions and individual
operations of the mind. Hence the importance of carefully weighing every
action of our lives, and every train of thought that we encourage in our
minds; for we never can determine the effect of a single act, or a
single mental process, in giving that influence to the character, or to
the moral condition, the result of which shall be decisive and
permanent. In the whole history of habits, indeed, we see a wondrous
display of that remarkable order of sequences which has been established
in our mental constitution, and by which every man becomes, in an
important sense, the master of his own moral destiny. For each act of
virtue tends to make him more virtuous; and each act of vice gives new
strength to an influence within, which will certainly render him more
more vicious.
These considerations have a practical tendency of the utmost interest.
In subduing habits of an injurious character, the laws of mental
sequences, which have now been referred to, must be carefully acted
upon. When the judgment, influenced by the indications of conscience, is
convinced of the injurious nature of the habit, the attention must be
steadily and habitually directed to the truths which produced this
impression. There will thus arise desire to be delivered from the
habit,--or, in other words, to cultivate the course of action that is
opposed to it. This desire, being cherished in the mind, is then made to
bear upon every individual case in which a propensity is felt towards
particular actions, or particular mental processes, referable to the
habit. The new inclination is at first acted upon with an effort, but,
after every instance of success, less effort is required, until at
length the new course of action is confirmed, and overpowers the habit
to which it was opposed. But that this result may take place, it is
necessary that the mental process be followed, in the manner distinctly
indicated by the philosophy of the moral feelings; for if this is not
attended to, the expected effect may not follow, even under
circumstances which appear, at first sight, most likely to produce it.
On this principle we are to explain the fact, that bad habits may be
long suspended by some powerful extrinsic influence, while they are in
no degree broken. Thus, a perso
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