ntiments of its opponents, ascribing them to
unworthy motives, or deducing from them conclusions which they do not
warrant. Candour, accordingly, may be considered as a compound of
justice and the love of truth. It leads us to give due attention to the
opinions and statements of others,--in all cases to be chiefly
solicitous to discover truth, and, in statements of a mixed character,
containing perhaps much error and fallacy, anxiously to discover and
separate what is true. It has accordingly been remarked, that a turn for
acute disputation, and minute and rigid criticism, is often the
characteristic of a contracted and prejudiced mind; and that the most
enlarged understandings are always the most indulgent to the statements
of others,--their leading object being to discover truth.
(6.) Justice is due to the feelings of others; and this applies to many
circumstances which do not affect either their interest or their
reputation. Without injuring them in any of these respects, or in our
own good opinion, we may behave to them in such a manner as to wound
their feelings. There are minds of an extreme delicacy, which, in this
respect, are peculiarly sensitive;--towards these a person of correct
feelings strives to conduct himself with suitable tenderness. We may
find, however, persons of honest and upright minds, who would shrink
from the least approach to real injury, but yet neglect the necessary
attention to the feelings; and may even confer a real benefit in such a
manner as to wound the individual to whom they intended kindness. The
lower degrees of this principle pertain to what is called mere good
breeding, which has been defined "benevolence in trifles;" but the
higher degrees may restrain from conduct which, without any real injury,
inflicts permanent pain. To this head we may perhaps also refer a due
regard to the estimate which we lead a man to form of himself. This is
opposed to flattery on the one hand, and on the other to any unnecessary
depreciation of his character. Flattery indeed is also to be considered
as a violation of veracity.
(7.) While, upon the principles which have been referred to, we abstain
from injuring the interests, the reputation, or the feelings of others,
there is another class of injuries, of still higher magnitude, which
the conscientious mind will avoid with peculiar anxiety, namely,
injuries done to the moral principles of other men. These form a class
of offences of which no h
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